TODAY, fragmentation and unityofthe internationallegal order has become its own topic of study' recognizing that a wide variety of international norms may create eomplex interactions and give rise to various types of confliets.' Jt is at this time that the relationship between international trade law and United Nations (UN) law, notably in the field of collective security, seems critica!. To date, however, this issue has rarely been analyzed in its full scope. In strict legal terms, this is hardly surprising as the relationship between both regimes has generally been subjected to a formalistic, hierarchical approach. Emphasis is given to the special status of the UN Charter through its Article 103, which establishes the priority of the Charter over obligations under any other international agreement in the context of maintenance of peace and security. Concerning the WTO, issues involving State national and international security are dealt with through provisions establishing relevant exceptions. Such is the case with Article XXI GATT '994, which Members may invoke as a justification for departing from their obligations. Article XXI (c) exempts a UN Member State from its WTO obligations when it acts 'in pursuance of its obligations under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security'.' Such clear·cut provisions seem to leave little room for a more thoroughgoing analysis. However, the scope of Article 103 needs further analysis before one can fully grasp the issue of the relationship between international trade law and other legal regimes. Article 103, because ofits wording,' has mostly been interpreted from the perspective of a conflict of norms.' Such a focus has been reinforced by the specificity of Article 103, which gives the UN Charter a unique status.' However, one should recognize that incompatibility of norms is the exception rather than the rule within a legal system. Article 103 must also be read in terms of compatibility. This provision does not exclude the application of principles and rules of WTO law ta the activities carried out by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter in the absence of a normative confliet.' The legal primacy of the UN Charter is thus merely one way among several to address the manifold interactions between WTO and UN law.
Some critieal changes in UN practice cali for a broader approach to analyzing the relationship between WTO law and UN law. Whereas economie sanctions were for a long time the sole UN-related challenge ta WTO law, the recent, surreptitiously growing economic interventionism of the UN has raised new challenges.' Economie sanctions mainly caver non-forcible measures adopted by the UN Security Council within the framework of its powers ta maintain international peace and security under Article 41 UN Charter" Those measures-be they commercial or finaneial embargos, aerial, naval embargoes, or the freezing of assets-pose an issue ofiegality under principles and rules ofWTO law including the principle requiring mostfavoured-nation (MFN) treatment. In such cases, the confliet rule of Article XXI (e) GATT 1994 is directly relevant. In the 1980s and the '990S, the Security Council's increasing recourse to economic sanctions as a means of carrying out Us responsi~ bilities brought this provision ta the forefront.
Article XXI (c) GATT '994 does not address ail of the complexity of the issues raised by UN sanctions. Further, and most importantly, it leaves partly unanswered questions arising from new forms of economic intervention by the UN through collective seeurity measures. One may think of the international administration of territories such as Kosovo and East Timor or the partieular case of the occupation of Iraq by the US and the UK under the unified command of the 'Authority'. Those new forms of economic intervention are developed in a fragmented and ad hocway, with littIe attention paid to international economie Iaw aspects. This chapter provides an overview of the UN activities in the economic field, which shows the limits of the predominant 'exception oriented' approach and the need ta rethink the relationship between international economic law and UN law. This rethinking appears necessary given the critical changes in the economic context of the Security Council activities, with, inter alia, economic threats increasingly linked to threats to international peace and security.'o In this respect, the recentlyestablished Peacebuilding Commission represents an important change in approach, as weil as the recognition of the increasing interface between collective security, maintenance of peace, and economie concerns. The parallel move in favour of strengthening and expanding the partnership between the UN and the private sector 'to promote the exercise of responsible investment in crisis areas'" makes this need for a new approach even more essential.
The integration of international economic law principles in post-conflict situations could contribute to the achievement of UN goals whèn it acts in the field of international peace and security. Peacebuilding activities, for example, require involvement in social and economic development as much as in political and institutional reform. It is crucial to address the causes of a conflic!. Taking into account international trade law in carrying out such activities may help to stabilize postconflict economies by providing the grounds for a more flexible transition once the UN is gone. A clearer reference to economic parameters in UN work may also allow for a more complete assessment of economic challenges in war-tom territories. This approach implies going beyond the mere question of the legality of UN action under WTO principles and rules and instead advocates the application of each of these bodies of norms together.
This chapter will first look at the WTO security exceptions provision, whieh can be invoked with regard to sanctions adopted outside the UN framework, in order to illustrate certain legal issues under WTO law. Articles XXI (al and XXI (bl GATT 1994 have often been assessed in terms of the risk they may pose to the whole WTO system by granting States discretion to depart from their GATT obligations. However, through reference to actual practice under this article, this chapter argues that such fears were overstated and that judicial review of States' unilateral determinations under these provisions is still admissible. These developments will help to shed sorne light on the relationship between WTO law and UN law conceming the issue of UN eeonomie interventionism and collective security activities. Finally, the case of small arms trade will provide an example of the complexity of the challenges WTO law faces as a result of the development of new UN instruments.
II. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND SECURITY EXCEPTIONS: AN OPEN DOOR?
The WTO system provides for specificexceptions that may be invoked bl' Members to depart from their obligations when security is at stake. They are found in Article XXI GATT '994 under the general heading of 'security exceptions'. However, the legal regime established under the WTO distinguishes between economic measures that a Member may adopt in accordance with the collective security regime of the UN Charter, and unilateral measures adopted by a Member for the purposes of its own security interests. Article XXI (a)-(b) GATT 1994 read as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shaU be construed (a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 0) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to 5uch traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirec tly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergeney in international relations.
While Article XX GATT 1994 contains explicitlegal requirements in order ta invoke an exception, Article XXI appears to mostly depend on a Member's own appreciation, and has been interpreted as allowing far more leeway to States in its application." The fear of an abuse ofthis articlewas thus seen as a threat ta the WTO system, particularly with regard ta a Member's power ta assess what il 'considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests'. According ta Lawenfeld, with a 'self-judging measure and no procedure created ta subject assertion ta international scrutiny, the provision had the potential to become a significant means for evading GATT ohligations'."
However, there are limits on the use of Article XXI (b). The absenceilf a specific legal requirement does not mean it contains no legal constraints. First, Article XXI (b) identifies in its subsections 'objective circumstances' ta be considered." For instance, subsection (i) limits the scope of potential action ta 'fissionable mate rials or the materials from which theyare derived '. Second, an element of necessity must be established, what seems to open the door ta international oversight. Each State is allowed to determine what measure it considers necessary to protect its security interests, and to determine the scope of the exception. Nevertheless, it is still possible to assess the compatibility of the resulting measures with WTO rules in the context of a dispute settlement procedure. Analogies can be drawn with other fields of internationallaw where States may take 'self-judging' decisions to determine what is necessary. In human rights law as weil as in the law on the use of force, for instance, the condition of necessity must be met by States to invoke exceptions or derogations to justify certain acts. This self-assessment can be reviewed in a judicial forum.
l5
Practice is scarce in terms ofinternational oversightwith regard ta A rticle XXI (b). A Panel was established under the GATT 1947 in US -TradeMeasures (Nicaragua). The US took the position that the legal terms of Article XXI (b) such as 'security interests' could not be the subject of examination or a decision by a Panel. The Panel did not have the opportunity ta rule on this question of principle since the terms of its mandate prevented its review.'• This being said, one cannat conclude that any judicial review would be excluded in the context of another dispute."
Sorne have considered that recourse ta Article XXI (b) ta justify a Member's adoption of unilateral 'sanctions' in violation ofits WTO obligations is not appropriate in the Iight of the specifie wording and scope ofthis provision. First, il has been interpreted as cavering mainly export restraints." Second, the action atfecting WTO rules needs ta be adopted in a particular field, at least for subsections (b) (i) and (ii). Cansequently, measures contemplated in this article seern to be more oriented towards aState that decides on restrictive measures on the basis of what is being traded rather than towards general measures taken against another State ta 'express disapproval of the acts of the targetstate or ta induce that state ta change sorne policy or practice or even its govemmental structure'." It then appears difficult to identify measures adopted under this provision that would be of a reactionary nature. The US measures imposing an import quota for Niearaguan sugar were adopted in retaliation for the Niearaguan support of subversive political activities. However, the us did not rely on Article XXI as a justification.'· This being said, one may support a broader interpretation of the expression 'protection of one's essential security interest' that goes beyond the specifie reference to fissionable materials and weapons. In this respect, aState could decide to exert trade restrictions against another State, in violation ofWTO principles and rules, arguing within the frame of Article XXI that unilateral economie sanctions are justified because the benefits stemming from those exports are used by the target State to support terrorist acts against that State or its citizens abroad.
While having a potential negative e!fect on the WTO system, the debate on the exceptions based on the protection of security interests remains marginal, in spite of the recent increase of threats to national security. territory, and also requesting that the government of Sierra Leone ensure that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds be in operation in Sierra Leone. On 7 March 2001, the Security Council unanimouslyadopted Resolution 1343, by which it imposed sanctions on Liberia, including an arms embargo and the adoption by ail States of necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect imports of ail rough diamonds. The Security Council specifically called 'upon the Government of Liberia to take urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of Liberia from the Liberia Shipping Registry and the Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes'.24 Concerning Iran, the Security Council adopted a first set of sanctions to prevent Tehran from developing further its nuclear programme. Sanctions were taken in another particular field-that is, 'ail items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems'." When Iran failed to complywith these UN Security Council resolutions, the Security Council passed a new resolution intensifying the existing sanctions."
III. UN ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONISM

Economic Considerations Linked to the Resort to UN Sanctions
Economie considerations linked to the resort to UN sanctions have so far been very marginal. The issue of political, humanitarian as weil as economic consequences of these measures-often referred to as side effects-has led to debates within the UN on the compatibility of such sanctions with rules of international human rights law andhumanitarian law. The 'side effects' issue had been raised early on with the adoption of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, but it was with the imposition of sanctions against Iraq-over a thirteen-year period-that the issue became particularly controversial.
17 Side effects obviously affectthe targe! State (whieh is the very reason for the adoption of the measures) but not necessarily in the manner in which theyare intended. The most harmful consequences generally fall on the civilian population far more than on members of the government.
Third States can also be affected, as a result of the growing interdependence of domestie economie systems." The UN Charter had considered the problem of the effects of sanctions from the outset, but in extremely limited and ambiguous ter ms. Article 50 UN Charter specifies that a third State, that is, aState not targeted by sanctions, 'which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shaU have the right ta consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems'." However, the Charter gives no definition of these 'special economic problems', and offers no guarantee of compensation. Il is, however, very important ta concretely identify the eeonomie impact of specific measures.'o Both the substance and the implementation of these measures have only rarely been considered in the light of principles and rules of international economie law, in particular those that favour free trade and non-discrimination. With regard to the growing recourse by the Security Council to measures having an economic impact, Harry Post wisely noted that 'such a series of wide-ranging, binding measures can no longer be considered limited or incidental economie curiosities ( ... ). In terms of international economic law, it might even be said that in recent years a new "international sanctions law" is emerging with its own instruments ( ... ), its own organs and institutions ( ... ).'''
UN Sanctions and Article XXI (c) GATT 1994
With regard to WTO law, UN eeonomie sanctions clearly violate the core principles that form the pillars of the international trade system. The most telling example is the decision to impose embargos or the 'complete or partial interruption of economic relations'. For instance, Security Council Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 obliged Member States to suspend imports and exports of aU commodities and products-except supplies for medical purposes-with regard to the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia.
Article XXI (c) GATT 1994 is widely invoked by States when implementing sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council." In contrast to unilateral measures regardingsecurity issues as foreseen in Article XXI (a)-(b) GATT 1994, the condition of necessity is not required for measures adopted under the UN Charter with a view to maintaining international peace and security. The only requirement that seems to prevail is that of a multilateral authorization given under the UN Charter. This seems to be the correct interpretation, unless one con,iders that a necessity requirement could be deduced from the spirit and the object of ail the exception clauses, including the one referring to action pursuant to a resolution adopted by a UN body in the context of the maintenance ofinternational peace and security. However, with practically non-existent travaux préparatoires and limited practice, there is very little to support this insertion of a necessity requirement.
Another issue deals with the effects of sanctions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on third States. It should be noted that the potentially disruptive effect on international trade of an abusive recourse to Article XXI GATT '994 was invoked with regard to unilateral economic measures adopted outside of the framework of the UN Charter. The GATT Council adopted a decision in 1982 relating to Article XXI in which it asked that the interests of third States that conld be injured by such actions be taken into account." This decision shares the spirit of Article 50 UN Charter and it can a fortiori be considered to apply to actions adopted in the framework of collective security.
The case of the Kimberley Process illustrates another challenge regarding the interpretation of Article XXI (c). Considering the criteria used in Article XXI (c), one may wonder what the scope is of the expression 'obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security' and more precisely whether this exception only applies to Security Council decisions or may also cover recommendations of the General Assembly. The issue came up in relation with the Kimberley Process, which provides for the creation of an international diamond certification programme.'· ln 2000, the UN General Assemblyadopted Resolution 55/56, calling for the adoption of measures to deal with the problem of trade in diamonds during armed conflicts." This resolution was part ofthe extension ofthe 1998 SecurityCouncil decision to impose sanctions. The only diamonds permitted to be exported from Angola were those that fulfilled the criteria of a monitoring system. They must be accompanied by an official certificate of origin.'6 Subsequently, through the Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002, the vast majority of countries mining, trading, and cutting diamonds agreed to adopt the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. States participating in the Kimberley Process agree to restrict trade to certified nQj1-conflict diamonds. Ali diamond trade between those States and the States not participating in the Kimberley Process is prohibited" The Security Council then gave its support to these agreements through Resolution '459, stating that it 'strongly supports the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, as weil as the ongoing process to refine and implement the regime, adopted at the Interlaken Conference as a valuable contribution against trafficking in conflict diamonds and looks forward to its implementation and strongly encourages the participants to further resolve outstanding issues.'" On 15 May 2003, WTO Members granted a waiver of GATT provisions to allow for the above-mentioned import and export restrictions on conflict diamonds. The GC decided that 'with respect to the measures taken bl' a Member listed in the Annex necessary to prohibit the export of rough diamonds to non-Participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, paragraphs 1 of Article I; 1 of Article XI; and 1 of Article XIII GATT 1994 are waived as of 1 January 2003 until31 December 2006'." This waiver did not cover the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme insofar as it concerned trade onlyin certified conflict diamonds as between the participating States. Clearly, therefore, it was believed thata waiverwas notnecessaryforthis aspectofthescheme. One may wonder why it was necessary ta have a waiver for the elements related ta trade in conflict diamonds with non-participating States. One cannot exclude that the waiver in this respect was a somewhat simplistic 'safety first' approach to the problem, without exploringfurther whether the security exception would also cover this aspect of the scheme," and in particular whether the resolutions of the General Assemblywould qualify as a multilateral authorization given under the UN Charter as provided for by Article XXI (c), especially in the light of the resolutions of the Seeurity Council on the same matter. economies in post-contliet situations as part of a global strategy to restore peace in war-torn territories. Such interventionism does not rely on any coherent framework. It is necessary for the UN to carry out its post-contlict activities by taking into account principles of international economic law such as transpareney and nondiscrimination in order to achieve its objective of sustainable peace, while at the same time taking into account the peculiarities of each country. Three cases illustrate the need for a paradigm shift. (2004) . Despite being 'deeply concerned by the deteriorating economie situation in Ivory Coast and its serious impact on the sub-region as a whole' and recognizing that economic development in Ivory Coast is a key element oflong-term stability, the Security Councilmostly limited the mandate ofUNOCI to traditional peacekeeping responsibility. UNOCI monitored the cease-fire of May 2003 and assisted in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes." !ts approach changed slightly over the next stages of the peace process, whieh involved economic development activities.
B. Framing UN Economie Intervention: The Need to Integrate WTO and International Economie Law Principles
Reconstruction of Economies br UN Peace-buildingOperations
A Report of the Secretary-General (SG), issued in May 2007, recommended that the UNOCI be assigned responsibility for supporting the economie recovery process in Ivory Coast, in coordination with other UN ageneies as well as with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB!' The SC endorsed this request in its Resolution 1765 ofJulY2007, andstressed the adaptation of the UNOC!'s role to the new phase of the peace process in Ivory Coast as set out in the Ouagadougou politieal Agreement." As implicitly suggested in the SGs latest report, this economie mandate calls for a dose cooperation between the various actors that are already engaged in reconstruction and recovery activity in Ivory Coast'" The exact scope of UNOC!'s economic role remains to be defined, but it mayindude 'support to the rehabilitation and re-equipment of soeial and economie infrastructure in the communities most atfected by conflie!' -one of the key objectives of the WB's rccent financial grant.'· Ivory Coast, as well as other countries, witnessed an increasing involvement ofthe UN in the economic sphere after peace was restored. Economie reconstruction was used as a tool aimed at preventing hostilities from breaking out again. Carrying out such action within the narrow framework of the collective security system cannot be satisfactory. Grounding the reconstruction of Ivory Coast on economie law pillars would contribute to strengthening the autonomous and sustainable character of the economy when the UN is gone." By resorting to principles of international trade law, the UN wou Id ensure that individuals, private companies, and local entities rely on such principles," rendering the transition towards UN disengagement and the integration within the international economic order easier." This would also have positive consequences for third States and foreign entities. ln that respect the recently established Peacebuilding Commission could be an appropriate forum for ,(8 The protection of' individuals and the market-place' being 'one of th e principal objects and purposes of the WTO', see Panel Report, US -Section301 Trade Act, at para 7.86 .
.(9 If. for example, the principle of non-discrimination were applicable, specifie provisions might. however, be considered ta grant preference ta local suppliers and contractors in order forthem to help start upthe local economyagain and contribute topost-contlict reconstruction. Therewould be a need to define the adjustments. for example, in the context of procurement practices.
designing new frameworks of coordination and integration ofeconomic parameters into the work of the UN in post-conflict situations.
b. The UN Peacebuilding Commission: A Promising Institutional Tooi
Stressing 'the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to postconflict peacebuildingand reconciliation with a viewto achievingsustainable peace', States have decided to create the UN Peacebuilding Commission. It is an intergovernmental advisory body meant 'to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development'.so This organ has promising and interesting implications with regard to the economic activities carried out under the ambit of the UN. It represents a novel opportunity to take economic considerations into account in the broader framework of reconstruction activities.
jointly created by the Security Council and the General Assembly," the Peacebuilding Commission is an advisory organ the main purpose of whieh is:
to bring together aU relevant actaes to marshal resources and to advise on and propose inteR grated strategies for postconflict peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. [n addition, it should provide recommendations and informa~ tion to improve the coordination of ail relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international communityto post-conflict recovery.52
In addition to the Commission, a Peacebuilding Fund was launched on 11 October 2006 at the request of the General Assembly'3 Aecording to its terms of reference, the Fund 'will support interventions of direct and immediate relevanee to the peaeebuilding process and eontribute towards addressing critieal gaps in that process, in particular in areas for whieh no other funding mechanism is availabIe." As the Commission is entitled to address the situation of partieular countries, it initiatedbetween July and December 2oo6-its first phase of substantive consideration of two eountries: Burundi and Sierra Leone.
55 Through country-specifie meetings, the Commission has formulated integrated peacebuilding strategies (IPBS) as the basis 2004.58 The approach and methodologyput forward by this newly created organ will be crucial for addressing economie challenges in the rebuilding ofwar-torn societies. It might be worth cooperatingwith the WTO and relevant regional economie organizations more close1y in this endeavour.
International Administration ofTerritories by the UN
Within its primary and traditional responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the UN Security Council has adopted new means to restore peace in war-torn terri tories. In the case of Kosovo and East Timor, the Council set up interim administrations responsible for fulfilling the traditional State functions, including managing the economy.59
These innovations inevitably led the UN to intervene in economic fields previously unexplored in terms oflegal framework and economic management. This has been particularly true in the case of Kosovo, where the mission is explicitly mandated to support economie reconstruction. The UN transitional administration in East Timor is another example, although it saw less UN intervention. Moreover, there are corn mon elements in these two experiences with regard to, inter alia. taxation and customs issues. 60 Security Council Resolution 1244 created an interim administration in Kosovo.
'
The Resolution makes several references to the economic dimension of the mission, including one of the main tasks of the international civilian presence in 'supporting the reconstruction ofkey infrastructure and other economic reconstruction'." It also 'encourages ail Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as weil as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance ofconvening an international donors' conference, ( ... ) atthe earliest possible date'''' As a result, UNMIK has become involved in the creation of a viable economy and the installation of an overall programme of economic stabilization. This has been achieved through the authorization of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to adopt a series of regulations, including Regulation No 199911 of 25 fuly '999, which establishes the powers of the interim administration in Kosovo. A council responsible for economic policy has been created alongside the adoption of a legal framework through a regulation adopted by the SRSG." In fact, sorne ofthese measures cali into question the monetary, financial, and economic unit y of the FRy"'The responsibility to deveiop and lead economic reconstruction activities to promote democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation in Kosovo fell to the EU in cooperation with the WB and other organizations, namely the implementation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, with considerable international support."" In terms of relevant princip les and norms of internationallaw to be taken into consideration, explicit mention of principles of international human rights law is generally made in Security Council resolutions or in the instruments adopted by the authorities responsible for territorial administration and reconstruction activities."7 However, no mention is made of principles and rules of international eco- (I]t became quite an extensive activity. Not that we questioned the substantive solutions in customs. taxation, banking or whatever the subject matter was. Our task was to review the regulations from a constitutional viewpoint. That is: were they in conformitywith the Charter, the pertinent Security Council resolutions, international human rights standards, etc?69
Human rights law may certainly be applicable with regard to sorne economie activities. The most significant example is the right to private property, which undoubtedly provides for legal guarantees and offers sorne indirect protection against abuses. Another example is the principle of non-discrimination, although its scope under human rights law'o does not fully cover trade and investments activities. Briefly put, international human rights law does not provide fulllegal guarantees and might be ill suited to deal with sorne economic activities and ensure, for example, that these are based on principles of transparency and fair competition.
Moreover, one ma y weil ask whether U N law is the proper yardstick to review customs, taxation or ban king regulations. While the UN has set up certain rules that apply to UN personnel, such as procurement rules," a wider approach that promotes and integrates general principles ofinternational economic law would be preferable.
Onemight argue that the international organizations engaged in ecanomie reconstruction activities will advocate for the application of rules that they have shaped through their normative and operational practice." However, affirming as a matter of principle the importance of the international rule of law for questions related to international trade, government procurement,13 or competition in the field of economie reconstruction still seems paramoun!. The procedures followed in the context of economic reconstruction would indeed benefit from cxplicit refcrence to dear legal criteria. Key standards such as openness and equity that are linked to the applieation of the well-established economic law principles of free competition and transpareney would help contribute to the reconstruction of stable domestie economies in the medium and long term. It would facilitate the transition of the newly recovered economies from a system backed by UN efforts to a sustainable system interacting within the international economie order.'·
The Occupation of Iraq and the UN Resolution 1483
The case of Iraq following the adoption of Resolution 1483 by the Security Council of 22 May 2003-albeit peculiar because of the regime of military occupation"-merits specifie attention. The role of the UN in this context raises new questions with respect to the recourse to eeonomie instruments, the international rule oflawas weil as issues of globallegitimacy and coherence of the UN system in its relations with other actors, institutions, and nQrms.
Security Council Resolution 1483 primarily specified that the legal regime in force in Iraq at the time was that of military occupation as provided in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and that the Coalition Provision al Authority (composed of the US and the UK) (CPA) was the occupying power. The Resolution also preseribed a role for the UN and other international organizations, but did not specify the law applicable to their activities. Il was the balance of power in the international system at the time that led to the recognition that the primar)' responsibility for the political and economic reconstruction ofIraq was in the hands of the CPA. As such, the international community rubber-stamped a system that had been established and managed by the US and the UK. The UN was involved in the process on the basis of a very narrow mandate, breaking awa)' from practiee developed in preceding years in the area of political and economie reconstruction.'· 1 n the economic field, Resolution 1483 envisioned the role of the UN and the international community through a range of complex procedures, whieh only accorded thema right to be informed, while thedecision-makingpower remained in the hands of the CPA. Thisremained true even though the UN had taken part, for the firsttime, in the setting up of a regime where economie considerations were predominant. With regard to the delicate question of the management and exploitation of natural resources, the CPA was granted jurisdiction over export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq. These prerogatives were to be exercised under certain conditions and subject to oversight and audit procedures conducted by certain responsible international organizations. However, the nature and the duration of these procedures were not seuled. The UN was given a coordinating role, in partnership with other international organizations, in 'promotingeconomic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development' and in 'facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure. 77 The Security Council resolution basically recognized, for the most part, the system put into place by the Coalition. In exchange, it obtained the recognition of the application of the law of military occupation with the concomitant minimum rules of proper economic behaviour as will be discussed below.
The issue of the relevant legal framework to caver these economic activities and the interaction between different sets of norms such as WTO law, the lawof occupation, and UN law arase in the context of two specifie cases. The first one deals with the GPA-a plurilateral agreement that binds onlysome ofthe WTO Members. This Agreement also provides for an exception clause covering security aspects, albeit formulated in more restrictive terms than the above-mentioned GATT 1994 security exception provision. Il does not refer to the UN Charter and specifies the types of measures that can be taken. Article XXIII specifies that:
1.
Nothing in thi, Agreement ,hall be construed to prevent any Party from taking any action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials. or to procucement indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes. The relevance of this provision was invoked in the context of an American decision of December 2003 in the framework of calls for tender relating to contracts for economic reconstruction in Iraq that limited the right to tender to only certain States. A memorandum titled 'Determination and Findings sought to justify this on the basis that it was 'necessary for the protection of the essential security interests of the United States to limit competition'." This raises the issue ofthe compatibility of such a measure with WTO rules, especially the non-discrimination principle contained in Article III GPA. 79 Could the exception of Article XXIII (1) be invoked?'o The issue is obviously linked to the problem of the relationship between the WTO agreements, the UN Charter, and the law of military occupation. Could one consider that the US, through the CPA, was in a position to benelit from the exception clause of the GPA by arguing that the decisions were taken in the framework of a regime ratilied by the Security Council in application ofChapter VII? Considering the restrictive wording of Article XXIII (1), which is limited to 'the protection ofessenlial security interests, this argument is rather dubious. Moreover, one may question ta what extent the national security exception would have been able to caver ail the reconstruction contracts envisaged by Washington. A similar legal debate, although framed in different terms, developed with regard ta other decisions adopted by the CPA.'I The Authority adopted orders and regulations, with reference to UN Security Council Resolutions, that changed the legal system in Iraq. provisions of the current Iraqi Patent and Industrial Design Law and related legislation does [sic] not meet current internationally-recognized standards of protection'. Il also recognizes 'the demonstrated interest of the Iraqi Governing Council for Iraq to become a full member in the international trading system, known as the World Trade Organization'. Moreover, it relies on the 'the Report of the Secretary General to the Security Coundl of )uly 17, 2003 , concerning the need for the development of Iraq and its transition from a non-transparent centrally planned economy to a free market economy'. The legal basis ofthis arder refers to various sets of norms.1t combines WTO law, law on military occupation, and UN law.
Subject to
Law on military occupation strictly limits the type of changes that can be made by the occupying power and does not enta il the right to modify any law." However, the interaction with UN Security Council resolutions raised sorne complex questions to determine whether or not occupation law was fully applicable in those contexts." One may neverthelessquestion the legality and legitimacy ofthose changes in Iraqi law. Although meeting WTO objectives and standards cou Id be seen as a fair justification, there is a need ta consider carefully the complex legal framework at stake, especially given the fact that WTO law is ta date not binding on Iraq.85 Despite lingering questions, the case of Iraq offers an interesting example of emerging UN practice referring ta the principle oftransparency. In Iraq, the international community was granted a right of supervision through a monitoring and audit system. The International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), created in October 2003-involving, in particular, the UN, the WB, the IMF, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development-had the responsibility ta ensure that the funds from the sale of petroleum and natural gas were used in accordance with the principle of transparency." The Iraqi government has subsequently decided ta create a national oversight body to succeed the IAMB and ensure respect for transparency principle." This example illustra tes the positive impact that the Security Council's consideration of economic principles can have on a domestic system. However, one must also acknowledge the serious issues raised in the context of the management of Iraqi revenues. The establishment of the IAMB did not solve these issues entire\y. There is therefore a crucial need to strengthen the principles oftransparency and non-discrimination. a State on the illicit trade of these weapons are one of the means for achieving the objectives of the various UN instruments on illicit trade of small arms. In arder ta justify these measures with regard ta WTO law, Article XXI (b)(ii) GATT '994 specifically allows a WTO Member ta take action 'it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating ta the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war'. Measures adopted ta implement the UN Programme of Action that would otherwise contravene WTO obligations on the elimination of quantitative restrictions can be justified under this provision. Article XXI (c) might also be relied upon, in as much as the UN Programme of Action recalls the threat ta the peace that illicit trade of arms represents. Adopting measures ta limit arms trade would then be understood as an action taken 'in pursuance of[a States] obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security'. Such reading may, however, be considered tao wide given the scope and nature of the 'obligations' at stake.
IV. WTO AND THE ARMS TRADE: THE CASE OF SMALL ARMS
A WTO Membercould also invokeArticleXXI (b)(ii) ta restrictarms exports, even ifperfectly legal, ta another WTO Member ifthere are reasonable grounds to believe that those weapons will be used against the exporting Member's territorial integrity or nation ais either by the importing Member or even by non-State actors supported by the importing Member. In such a case, the notion of'essential security interests: as contained in Article XX1, could be read in a wide and preventive way given the increasing importance of security considerations for Members'" For example, the struggle against terrorist threats could lead to new restrictive measures.
The Programme of Action, which is notlegally binding, callsfor the developmentof new norms at the internationallevel ta strengthen the effort ta combat illicit trade." In that respect, the interaction between WTO law and other treaties and instruments in the field of arms trade could raise sorne very interesting questions. MutuaI supportiveness between arms trade conventions and instruments and WTO principles and rules should be sought. Given the importance of ensuring cooperation and compliance by ail States so to combat illicit trade of small arms, one may also envisage the resort to economic sanctions as a means to force a State ta respect its commitments.
Although the debate over countermeasures is dealt with elsewhere in the Handbook," it is helpful ta point out here that the Protocol Against the 27(2) of the Convention provides explicitly for the possibility of adopting collectively authorized sanctions." Under that provision, the competent organ could decide upon the adoption of sanctions of an economic nature that contradict WTO rules and that could be based on Article XXI (b)(ii).
The same issue may arise in the context of future negotiations on a comprehensive international treaty establishing common international standards for the import, export, and transfer of small arms."
v. CONCLUSIONS: THE NEED FOR A NEW ApPROACH?
The UN is increasingly engaging in activities of an economic nature in the framework of its collective security mandate. There is therefore a need to think about the overall internationallegal framework for these activities in a more coherent manner. This approach should start with the recognition of the necessity to address the economie, as well as humanitarian, effects of sanctions.
Above ail, while the yielding ofboth Article 103 UN Charter and Article XXI (c) GATT 1994 to the interests ofpeace and securityis partly justified, it does not provide satisfying answers when it comes to the new economic role played by the UN.1t is the authors' view that these provisions do not exclude taking into account WTO law and principles of international trade law within the context of collective security activities of an economic nature. An approach that takes these principles into account would improve the long term efficiency of UN action and would advance the goal of achieving sustainable peace. It would provide a coherent framework to address economic challenges arising in post-conflict situations. If economic recovery is to be a pillar of peace, UN involvement needs to be based on legal principles to secure the pro~er functioning of post-conflict economies. It is critical in order to ensure that post-conflict transition and UN disengagement do not destabilize the economy, as was identified in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Keeping Operations." This being said, carefuI attention should be paid to the specificities of each situation. Depending on the scale and the nature of the conflict as weil as the local context, economic reconstruction may cali for flexible and tailored solutions. The country-specifie method at the heart of the Peacebuilding Commission's work stems fromthis logic" The increasing recognition of a more coordinated approach would help to go beyond the current logic of deference of WTO law towards UN law and encourage greater complementarity. This new approach is also relevant at the institutional leve! in terms of sharing of tasks and responsibilities. With the UN being increasingly involved in economic matters, there is a critieal issue of coordination regarding the respective powers and competences of each organization involved. The existing institutional cooperation scheme between the WTO and the UN is governed by the Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with other Intergovernmental Organizations -Relations Between the WTO and the UN signed on '5 November 1995. The Chief Executive Board is composed of executive heads from various UN bodies, the WTO, and Bretton Woods institutions and meets twice a year under the chairmanship of the UN SG. It seeks to promote coherence bath within the UN system and outside ofit and serves as the main instrument to coordinate actions and policies. Such a forum could be used to further explore new approaches for the UN to take into account international economie law principles. On the other han d, the WTO as an institution should be more proactive in the promotion ofinternational trade law principles and rules as a means to contribute to the stabilization of societies that have gone through major conflicts. 
